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ABSTRACT: 
The use of money can involve either an electronic adjustment or the exchange of cash. 
Phasing out cash has costs such as the disruption of privacy and the loss of seigniorage 
revenues, and benefits such as less criminal activities, reduction of tax evasion and an 
unconstrained monetary policy at the Zero Lower Bound. Nowadays, new technologies are 
challenging the use of cash, which implies rethinking the role of money to facilitate 
transactions. This paper makes a welfare analysis using a Real Business Cycle model with 
money to find the optimal share of electronic money. Additionally, the effects of tax evasion, 
transaction costs and the long-run inflation rate are estimated.  
KEYWORDS: 
Cash; Electronic Money; Real Business Cycle Model; Steady-State Solution; Transaction 
Costs; Tax Evasion; Zero Lower Bound. 
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1. Introduction 
Money is primarily used as a medium of exchange to facilitate transactions and as a store of 
value. The incipient digitalization allows a substantial increase in the use of electronic money 
in substitution of paper money because technology eases its use. Nonetheless, the world is 
drowning in cash because big amounts of it are still in circulation, with a surprisingly share 
of big-denominated bills (i.e. $100, €500…). Notice that the European Central Bank has 
stopped issuing €500 bills, this is a first step to restraint the use of cash. 
Therefore, cash is still there and due to its anonymity property in addition to its ease of 
transportation and storing, it implies that it is commonly used for criminal activities and tax 
evasion. Besides, cash constraints monetary policy as it is going to be analysed. 
Phasing out cash would be beneficial because it would be a burden for tax avaders and those 
undertaking criminal activities. These gains are supposed to outweigh the losses of less 
privacy, the cost of the digitalization transformation and the loss of seigniorage revenues for 
governments. 
That is why, this paper aims to make a welfare analysis of the optimal quantity of cash in a 
representative economy. This analysis is going to be undertaken with a Real Business Cycle 
with money model that has been calibrated to replicate the US economy. The optimizing 
program leads to 21 functions with 21 variables. The model is solved in steady-state 
equilibrium using MATLAB software, which it is helpful for the analysis of the long-run 
values of each variable of the model. 
The elimination of cash should be seriously considered by governments. However, big-
denominated coins such as €10 coin (they are more difficult to carry in big amounts) could 
be maintained in circulation in order to facilitate daily and small transactions and meanwhile, 
it is respectful with the privacy of individuals. 
This paper has the following structure. In Section 2 the quantity of cash in circulation in both 
the Euro area and the US is reviewed. Section 3 deeply analyses, the cost and benefits from 
eliminating cash. Section 4 presents a plan for phasing out cash. Section 5 develops the Real 
Business Cycle Model with money, the optimizing programs and baseline calibration in 
Steady-State. Section 6 provides an analysis of the tax evasion effect, the electronic money 
transaction costs and the long-run inflation rate. Finally, some conclusions are given. 
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2. Quantity of cash in circulation 
This section briefly describes how much cash is in circulation in both the European Union 
and United States. Having a view of the trend in the use of cash is important in order to 
know the departure point on this issue.  
Kenneth Rogoff on its “The Curse of Cash” book gives some empirical evidence that is of 
concern. For example, in the US, 77% of total cash in circulation is demonstrated in $100 
bills and approximately half of them are held abroad and are out of government control. 
Within the European Monetary Union, the €500 bill accounts for 30% of total cash in 
circulation and it is held by few people. The following figures from Rogoff (2016) gives a 
perspective of how the use of cash relative to GDP has increased recently, in both the US 
and the European Monetary Union despite the increase of e-transactions. 
Figure 1: EURO Currency to GDP 
 
Source: Rogoff (2016), Chapter 3. 
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Figure 2: US Currency to GDP 
 
Source: Rogoff (2016), Chapter 3. 
The question is clear. Why does a monetary system need such big value bills? And what is 
being done with them? Corruption, terrorism and tax evasion are some of the problems that 
are involved in the use of cash because bills are easy to transport and store. The latter, gives 
an idea of how overwhelming and important the optimal use of cash in an economy is, and 
that its elimination have more gains than losses as it is going to be discussed in this paper. 
3. Benefits and costs from phasing out cash 
The quantity of cash circulating in any developed economy is supposedly higher than the 
cash that is being used, or at least the amount of cash used that is recorded by the authorities. 
Although it might be hard to quantify, most of the cash is being used in criminal activities as 
well as in the underground economy, and currencies such as the dollar and the euro are held 
abroad without any control. In this section the benefits and costs of eliminating cash from 
the economy will be briefly exposed.1 Electronic money would decrease tax evasion and 
criminal activities, would protect public health from disease and let more room for monetary 
bodies in setting interest rates. On the other hand, it would harm privacy, require a huge 
capital investment and profits for governments from seigniorage would disappear. 
                                                          
1 Following Chapter 5 of Rogoff (2016). 
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3.1 Benefits 
3.1.1 The underground economy: Tax Evasion 
The use of cash is heavily linked with its use for evading taxes. Cash transactions do not have 
to be registered to be done. Then, if no cash existed, it would be harder to evade taxes. This 
is a problem more common in small daily transactions or cash-intensive firms. The 
transaction could be made in exchange of cash, but it might never be recognized in the ledger 
or never reported to tax authorities. Schneider et. al (2010) found that the average shadow 
economy counts for about 17.1% of official GDP over 162 countries between 1999 and 
2007. Notice that shadow economy is understood as the underground economy, where 
economic activities are undertaken with lack of legal supervision and therefore, do not report 
taxes. Policies to overcome this data are hard to assess, and furthermore, there is a positive 
link between the tax rate and the underreported taxes, that simultaneously marginal tax rates 
have a positive and significant influence on currency holdings. (Lynch, 1985).  
This gives an idea of how much would the economy and tax authorities benefit from 
removing cash. Tax revenue could be collected effortless and the tax gap would be reduced 
because any to transaction would be registered and automatically reported. This would be a 
gain for the entire society since more collection of taxes would mean either higher budget 
for the government to spend or a lower tax rate to be applied.  In fact, in India, there has 
been a withdrawn of 86% of their paper currency with the main target of eradicating tax 
evasion.2 
Phasing out cash would improve equality of opportunities since everybody should report 
their entire income and then, nobody is cheating the system, which would be unfair for the 
ones who report taxes. This is one of the major benefits from removing cash. 
3.1.2 Criminal activities 
Within criminal activities, the main method of payment used is cash, which might be 
laundered by recognizing false profits at any firm. Cash is used in corruption, drugs, 
terrorism, human trafficking…etc. Almost any illegal activity you can imagine is cash-
intensive. 
                                                          
2 Found at the Irish Examiner, Hearne (2017). Note that India is not prepared to be cashless (93% of labour 
contracts are illegal), so they took a step back increasing supply again by 87% and then, corruption continues. 
(Sivabalan, 2017). 
8 
 
Phasing out cash would not mean that any criminal activity would disappear because there 
will be found other means of engaging in criminal activities. However, what it is true that in 
case that there were no cash, it would be much harder for criminals to undertake such 
activities and it would be a substantial reduction of them. Therefore, thanks to the traceability 
of electronic transactions, both the economy and the society would benefit from less criminal 
activities. Wright et. al (2017) found evidence in a study that there was a shrink in crime 
activities in the USA over several decades that comes simultaneously with a drop on cash 
usage. 
Lastly, despite counterfeiting is already too difficult, with only electronic money or just small 
€10 coins in circulation, it would be almost impossible. 
3.1.3 Monetary policy: Zero Lower Bound (ZLB) 
Cash constraints room for monetary policies. As long as people had the opportunity to 
ensure that the value of their assets or bank deposits is not going to be reduced when negative 
interest rates take place, monetary authorities are constrained. The nature of cash makes it 
hard to penalize in nominal terms. That is why cash is a hindrance for monetary policy when 
negative interest rates would be necessary. This section is going to be given special attention 
since it is hard to incorporate into the upcoming model and it is an issue that must not be 
forgotten. 
Currently, just when the worst financial crisis after the Great Depression is almost over, 
monetary authorities such as the European Central Bank (ECB) or the Federal Reserve Bank 
(Fed) are struggling with the stagnation of the economy, with low inflation and a slow 
recovery (the so-called Great Recession period). The way these authorities have fought the 
slow recovery is by bringing down the interest rates3 or issuing mass amounts of money, 
Quantitative Easing (QE) in order to increase liquidity in the economy. QE has been 
undertaken by purchasing assets of either governments or firms operating within the euro 
area. The latter has been used by the ECB because its inability to boost the economy with 
low interest rates until due to zero-bound and, that means, facing the liquidity trap. Another 
alternative used by central banks has been forward guidance, which is bringing down the real 
interest rate when reaching the zero-bound. Forward guidance is based on the credibility of 
                                                          
3 It is defined as the one-month Treasury bill rate that a given government pays to borrow from private 
markets. 
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any central bank, since they have to be believed that they will certainly target that inflation 
to pull down inflation expectations.  
In an economy where money holdings and bonds can be substituted with each other, the 
preference for money depends on the nominal interest rate, which means that by lowering 
interest rates, the bonds yield is lower and therefore the demand for money holdings 
increases, which at the same time is an incentive for people to spend this money in other 
assets or goods and services, what would increase total output. The interest rate is also used 
as refence for lending and borrowing money between economic agents. In case of a long 
recession, lowering interest rates should boost the economy. Nonetheless, if this results to 
be ineffective, there exists the risk reaching the Zero Lower Bound (ZLB) or liquidity trap, 
where they cannot go further than zero because of the existence of cash. 
That means that agents have already changed their preferences for holding money due to the 
lower yield of bonds, and however, it has been not enough stimulus for pushing output. The 
problem is bigger than it seems because the solution for this trap would be bringing interest 
rates below zero and with the existence of cash it is not easy because the negative interest 
rates make economic agents to exchange most of the assets they have for cash, because at 
least cash is not decreasing its face value and pays 0%. It sounds crazy. Negative interest 
rates would consist of a world were borrowers are awarded and savers are penalized. 
Although the neutrality of money in the long-run, the use of monetary policy to fix short-
term issues is very useful. 
The idea of negative interest rates would be effective only if cash is totally or partially phased 
out. If negative interest rates were possible and people could not exchange their bank 
deposits for cash, people would start consuming and investing more before they run out of 
savings. This can be also translated into a lower cost of borrowing than before, which fosters 
investment and consumption too, mostly durable goods. The decrease in interest rates also 
makes people with high valuable assets feel wealthier, and then, they would spend more as 
asset prices will go up. 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡: ↓ 𝑖 → ↑ 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑
↑ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 → ↑ 𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 
𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡: ↓ 𝑖 → ↑ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 →↑ 𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ →↑ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
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Similarly, a reduction of interest rates, the economy there is an improvement of the terms of 
trade, since lower interest rates make the home currency weaker against other currencies, 
which is translated into both more exports and less imports. The country undertaking 
negative interest rates would export more because their goods and services offered to the 
rest of the world are cheaper thanks for the depreciation of the exchange rate. Similarly, 
importing from the rest of the world is going to be more expensive due to the weak exchange 
rate, and therefore, many firms would be forced to stop importing from abroad and 
substitute it by local suppliers. These two effects improve the current account of the country, 
pushing up aggregate demand and then, total output.4  
𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡: ↓ 𝑖 → ↓ 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 → 
↑ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ↓ 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 →↑ 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 → 
↑ 𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑  
Negative interest rates would work that well if, and only if the reduction into negative bounds 
work the same way as a reduction within positive bounds. It should be discussed whether 
they can cause instability or if it is possible to maintain financial stability. Stability is crucial 
due to the fact that for example it does not matter whether the rate of inflation is 2% or 8% 
if it is totally foreseeable and stable and the credibility of the central bank is not 
compromised. Wages and the whole economy can easily adapt to an expected and totally 
certain inflation. 
According to Kenneth Rogoff, the bequest coming from the German mark discipline, has 
been transmitted to the Euro monetary policy and then, the ECB has been committed to 
attach their expected inflation to low rates, which is a target of 2%. This target is said to be 
inflexible to cope with changes in last years, which eventually have compromised the 
economy to reach the zero lower bound. He points out at least three reasons explaining why 
monetary authorities are currently dealing with the zero lower bound: 
1. Setting the expected inflation to 2% might be too low because it needs lower interest 
rates than a higher expected inflation, say 6%, in order to maintain the real interest 
rate5 in the long-run, which finally, it is what really matters. 
                                                          
4 See Krugman et al. (2012) and Blanchard and Johnson (2015). 
5 Note that the real interest rate is: 𝑟 = 𝑖 − 𝜋𝑒 , being 𝑟 the real interest rate, 𝑖 the nominal interest rate and 𝜋𝑒 
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2. Secondly, the volatility of past years has been quite high, making central banks to 
change their interest rates with many cuts. 
3. Finally, the fall of real interest rate below zero as well as below from normal levels. 
This could be explained by the high savings of emerging markets or the aging 
population in developed countries, which leads to slower growth, and then, it brings 
low interest rates in the short run equilibrium of credit markets.  
Of course, it is well known that there exists the possibility of using fiscal policy to get out 
the zero lower bound. A permanent or temporary fiscal expansion will boost the economy 
depending on the magnitude of the fiscal expansion and its credibility. The main drawback 
with it is that this kind of policy would generate budget deficit that must be backed by future 
taxes. A smart idea to boost demand and fight against zero lower bound would be drone 
money. This idea consists of targeting low income individuals in an economy and giving 
them a certain amount of money, so they can spend. The reasons behind this policy is that, 
these people would save less than mid-income or high-income individuals, and therefore, 
demand would increase while inequality is also fought. However, this is only a second-best 
alternative after the abolition of cash and an alternative to QE.  
Although phasing out cash is the most plausible idea, in the literature it is found other ways 
for breaking the ZLB: 
• Stamp tax: It consists of making people pay periodically for a stamp on their paper 
currency, that is, making people pay interest rates for using currency. The idea comes 
from Gesell (1916) and it is known as “stamp money”. At Gesell´s time the idea was 
fascinating. In fact, during the Great Depression, some experiments were done such 
as in Wörgl, Austria, where its citizens had to buy every month stamps for 1% of the 
value to maintain its validity. There has been studied other variants to this idea such 
as expiration dates for papers or even lotteries, where the resulting serial numbers 
from that lottery, will lose their value. Nowadays, this crazy monetary policy could 
be feasible thanks to technological improvements. However, it is not elegant, and it 
seriously compromises the anonymity of people holding paper currency.  
• Two-currency system: This first idea was first developed by an economist called 
Robert Eisler (1933). This is also some of the bequest that the Great Depression left. 
                                                          
the expected inflation rate set by a given monetary authority. 
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Eisler pointed out that in order to stabilize prices, a two-currency system within an 
economy may be possible. The idea is based on the existence of a “money banco” 
and “current money”, where one can be used only electronically and the other 
physically. Both currencies have an exchange rate between each other, that is 
managed by the respective central bank. These two currencies might be dollar bills 
on the one hand and electronic dollar on the other hand. This already exists, although 
the exchange rate between them is one. When the Fed would like to charge interest 
rates on electronic dollars (banco money), it only needs to set an exchange rate for a 
certain period. In case it is changed from one/one to say, one electronic dollar for 
0.98 dollar, the central bank is charging a negative interest rate of 2%, that as long as 
both are set at the same time, people will not run into cash. 
Despite what is generally though about the ZLB, Jarrow (2013) claims that there does not 
actually exist a real ZLB. For Jarrow, the use of negative interest rates is possible given the 
existence of cash, so ZLB is a myth and not a reality. He points out that models applied to 
design fiscal and monetary policy contain the ZLB, which means that the outcome can be 
misleading and thus, the policy. One of the main arguments he uses is that the storage of 
cash is already too costly and risky for either firms or individuals and therefore, arbitrage 
opportunities between cash and bonds it is restrained to a given quantity.6  When reaching 
negative interest rates, the quantity of bonds traded in exchange for cash is restrained due to 
the huge risk of loss and credit risk and therefore no arbitrage exists.  
The latter is contrary to what Kenneth Rogoff believes that in case negative interest rates 
were implemented and no major changes were made, nobody would benefit from borrowing 
from this policy because investors are unwilling to lend money to borrowers. There would 
be massive runs into cash much bigger than what already happened during the peak of the 
financial crisis in 2008. Rogoff talks about imposing a tax on large-scale cash storage. 
However, this would hardly discourage tax evasion or criminal activities. Besides, for banks 
it would be hard to pass interest rates to customers (mainly small) because of the fear of 
losing them. They prefer passing negative rates by charging higher commissions, which has 
already happened within the euro area and, in fact, it is believed that this practice reduces 
                                                          
6 Arbitrage opportunities are possible under negative interest because Jarrow assumes that both bonds and cash 
are riskless assets which cannot have different returns. In case bonds have negative interest and cash is just a 
mean for storing value, an arbitrage opportunity does exist. 
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even more the willingness to lend from commercial banks. 
Although the possibility to apply negative interest rate during the financial crisis, it would be 
very hard to know if this would have worked well or if the economic recession would have 
been solved earlier than it has already been solved. In fact, Buiter (2010) suggests that 
according to the Taylor rule7, the interest rates in the US in 2009 should have been further 
below from 0%, between -5% and 7.5%, and thus the Zero Lower Bound has been hindering 
the recovery.  
Eggertsson et. al (2013) suggests that the recovery during the financial crisis in the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) would have been much faster if peripheral countries would have 
implemented structural reforms. This is the only way that these countries can regain 
competitiveness and boost output. The policy undertaken to get out of the recession has 
consisted of depreciating the Euro and then, increasing the expectations of growth, so 
aggregate demand is increased. This policy does not fix the effects in the case that another 
crisis hits Europe. The structural reform is needed, but it would be only effective if it does 
not have to deal with the ZLB. It would deepen the recession while worsening deflation with 
a higher real interest rate. Without it, the impact of such reforms during an economic 
downturn is positive and much higher in magnitude. 
When it comes to dealing with negative interest rates, the abolition of paper currency seems 
to be the best option against others such as a tax in paper currency or creating an electronic 
and a paper currency which have an exchange rate between each other. (See Buiter, 2010) 
3.1.4 Public Health 
Although this issue seems to be less important, public health would be slightly improved by 
the elimination of cash. The main point is that cash is dirty, and it is usually a way of spreading 
and transmitting diseases and harming public hygiene. 
3.2 Costs 
3.2.1 Privacy 
Privacy is probably one of the most important downsides that may arise. Nobody wants to 
be totally controlled by the government and provide private information about any 
                                                          
7  The Taylor rule is defined as the positive relationship between the interest rate and the output gap and the 
excess of actual and expected inflation (Taylor, 1993). 
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transaction that is made. This “Big Brother” effect is impossible to avoid since every 
transaction is going to recorded and available for the government and the civil freedoms are 
going to be compromised. Then, a balance between privacy rights and collect taxes and 
reduce crime should be reached.8 
On the other hand, it could be argued that most people´s information and bank transactions 
are already disposed for governments and tax authorities recently known as Big Data. 
Information will be needed to the extent that it is useful to collect taxes. However, law and 
regulatory issues should be revisited so this private information is not badly used. That is 
why, there is no need to totally remove cash from the economy since few large coins could 
remain in circulation. 
Omariba et. al (2012) point that the future of banking systems passes through the confidence 
of users that there is nothing to worry about. They also claim that there are security issues in 
electronic money and bank systems that could damage privacy issues that would affect 
consumer´s confidence. 
3.2.2 Capital investment 
This issue could be a bit controversial because it is impossible to predict that the transaction 
cost of managing cash will be lower than the cost of a cashless economy. It is true that 
phasing out cash from the economy needs from a huge initial investment that makes available 
e-transactions in any case or need. That needs from sophisticated software, electronic devices 
without forgetting the inclusion of the entire society into the system. Elderly people, low 
income individuals, homeless people…etc. may need special consideration. It should be 
neither forgotten investment in maintenance and security, the risk of cyber attacks is real but 
also the reduction of cash exposal to thefts.9 
Transaction costs changes will be analysed deeper when explaining the model of this paper.  
3.2.3 Seigniorage 
Seigniorage is the profit that central banks obtain from issuing money in form of cash. 
Therefore, this is the only quantifiable cost that can be compared with gains and it is the 
                                                          
8 See Chapter 7 of Rogoff (2016) 
9 There is a recent technology called Blockchain, which may allow to decrease transaction costs, but its analysis 
is not the aim of this paper. This technology would help optimize transaction costs and protect privacy issues 
thanks to its ledger.  
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main counterargument used for not phasing out cash. Stopping the issuance of cash would 
mean a loss for central banks and its government. However, this loss is insignificant with the 
gains above discussed (mainly with tax evasion). The estimated cost of giving up seigniorage 
according to Rogoff (2016) it would be between 0.4% and 0.8 % of GDP in the US economy. 
Note that this loss is bigger than it should because of the underground economy, cash abroad 
and the use of cash for criminal activities. 
4. A plan for phasing out cash 
By using all the arguments above explained, Rogoff (2016) has already designed a plan for 
phasing out (or partially) cash which consists of the following stages: 
1. Phasing out paper currency beginning with big bills and finishing with small coins. 
This phase could last forever since there is no need to phase totally out cash. There 
could be small coins of €10 for the use of daily transaction or small operations. The 
idea of using this kind of coins has to do with how difficult it might be to illegally 
transport huge quantities of physical money. The aim is to get rid of large notes. 
2. Financial inclusion. This stage would consist of ensuring that everybody have access 
to debit or credit cards or any device or tool which allows to use electronic money. 
This is up to the government how to do it. This would focus specially on low-income 
and elderly people. 
3. Privacy. There would be needed regulation and new law enforcement to ensure that 
the system works well. It must be discouraged any other means of transaction hidden 
from the government. 
4. Ensure that transactions are made in real-time. A trustful payment infrastructure that 
allows safety and immediate payments. 
Nonetheless, there is not an absolute truth. As Rogoff suggests, it might be that cash will 
never be completely withdrawn from the economy. Beretta (2014) strongly believes that cash 
would be necessary in any post-industrial economy because cash already plays a symbolic 
sense for people, that is objectively quantifying how much money they do have. 
5. The Real Business Cycle model 
In this section, a model has been created with the aim of approximately estimating the 
optimal quantity of electronic and paper currency, and also seeing how the different 
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advantages and drawbacks that electronic money has may affect welfare.  
This is the main section of the paper and it consists of the development of a Real Business 
Cycle (RBC) model. It is a macroeconomic model based on micro-foundations generally used 
to analyse the operating characteristics of an economy and make decisions. Lucas (1976), 
claimed in his Lucas Critique that macroeconomics needed to be analysed from micro-
foundations with resources constraints, preferences and parameters rather than just focusing 
on historical data.  
This approach claims that the economy changes due to multiperiod fluctuations. Despite its 
simplicity, the fit of the model is surprisingly good. Kydland and Prescott (1982). This kind 
of models have as standpoint the utility function of a representative household as the basic 
economic unit. The utility function faces an optimizing problem subject to a budget 
constraint. An important characteristic is that in these models, in steady-state solution, a rise 
in monetary growth rate is equal to a rise in the inflation rate while it leads the utility level to 
decrease in steady-state. Sidrausky (1967). In the RBC model of this paper, money is going 
to be treated as transaction-facilitating, making transaction costs to fall. Goodfriend and 
McCallum (2007). 
A RBC model is suitable for this paper proposes because it can be modified to incorporate 
both cash and electronic money as it is going to be seen. It allows a long-run analysis when 
it is solved in steady-state which will provide quantitative and qualitative analysis. 
5.1 Model presentation 
Electronic money is defined as the checking account balance that individuals can hold in 
commercial banks. Cash or paper currency is understood as the bills and coins that people 
hold either at home, wallet or elsewhere. As it has been discussed before, this money is said 
to be anonymous money since the privacy is not compromised. 
In this economy people choose between two different means of holding the same currency, 
that is electronically 𝑚𝑡
𝑒and paper currency 𝑚𝑡
𝑐 in each period t: 
𝑚𝑡 = 𝑚𝑡
𝑒 + 𝑚𝑡
𝑐 
Where 𝑚𝑡 stands for the total amount of currency in the economy and period t. Note that 
since consumers care mainly about the amount of goods they might afford throughout time, 
these quantities are in real terms rather than nominal;  𝑚𝑡
𝑒 =
𝑀𝑡
𝑒
𝑃𝑡
 ;  𝑚𝑡
𝑐 =  
𝑀𝑡
𝑐
𝑃𝑡
. Note that 𝑃𝑡 is 
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the aggregate price level. 
Having these two types of holding currency it would be interesting to see them in terms of 
share, that is: 
𝑠𝑡 =
𝑚𝑡
𝑒
𝑚𝑡
𝑒 + 𝑚𝑡
𝑐 =  
𝑚𝑡
𝑒
𝑚𝑡
 
Where 𝑠𝑡 is the share of electronic money held in this economy and in contrast, the term 
(1 − 𝑠𝑡) is the share of paper money or cash in the economy. 
Of course, holding money in different means implies different costs and benefits for 
individuals, which are presented as it follows: 
On the one hand, holding electronic money instead of cash is beneficial for individuals since 
huge quantities of cash running within an economy eases criminal activities, and more 
specifically, the underground economy. On the other hand, with cash, making business out 
of the government control is easier and therefore, people will try to cheat the system in order 
to pay less taxes. When that is the case, tax authorities will need to increase either tax rate in 
order to keep collecting the same quantity of revenue and thus to hold the same budget. If 
individuals hold more electronic money, the tax evasion decreases, and therefore, as more 
people is paying taxes, tax authorities can lower tax rates to hold budget available constant. 
It leads to the following relation: 
𝜏𝑡 = 𝜏0 − 𝜏1𝑠𝑡 
Where 𝜏𝑡 is the income tax rate (ranging 0 < 𝜏𝑡 < 1) bore by both labour and capital income 
in period t. As discussed, the higher the share of electronic money, the lower the income tax 
rate that individuals must pay. Here, 𝜏0  is the fraction of  𝜏𝑡 that is not affected by the 
electronic money held by individuals and 𝜏1 is another parameter that sets to which extent 
the share of 𝑚𝑡
𝑒 in period t lowers the actual income tax rate.  
On the other hand, if paper money were going to be totally phased out, the government 
control exerted over individuals would be much higher than before. There are many issues 
about how to deal with privacy which would need to be overcome in order to make it feasible. 
Indeed, this would mean an undoubtedly preference for individuals to hold paper currency 
instead of holding it electronically.  
The following utility function is for an economy with identical households whose utility 
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depends positively on the amount of goods consumed at period t, 𝑐𝑡 and negatively on both 
the amount of time they spend in working at period t that is 𝑛𝑡 , and the share of electronic 
money in the economy at period t, 𝑠𝑡: 
𝑈(𝑐𝑡, 𝑛𝑡 , 𝑠𝑡 ) =
𝑐𝑡
1−𝜚
1 − 𝜚
− Ψ
𝑛𝑡
1+𝛾
1 + 𝛾
+ 𝑏0(1 − 𝑠𝑡)
𝑏1 
                                   (+, −, −) 
The utility function presents the following partial derivatives: 
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑛𝑡
< 0,  
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑐𝑡
> 0 and 
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑠𝑡
< 0, 
with 𝛾, 𝜚, 𝑏0 and 𝑏1 as positive coefficients. The higher the number of goods consumed by 
households, the better meanwhile the higher either the quantity of labour and electronic 
money share, the worse. Parameters such as Ψ, 𝑏0 and  𝑏1 are collecting to which extent an 
increase in  𝑛𝑡 and  𝑠𝑡 are shaping the utility function respectively. 
In this utility function, the parameters 𝜚 and 𝛾 are known as the Constant Relative Risk 
Aversion (CRRA) coefficient. They contribute to the utility function by shaping the 
preferences of households or individuals and with the property of a diminishing marginal 
utility for consumption and increasing labour marginal disutility, that is,  
𝜕2𝑈
𝜕𝑐𝑡
2 < 0 and 
𝜕2𝑈
𝜕𝑛𝑡
2 >
0 . This is useful in such a way that household’s utility does not increase at very fast rates 
when they enjoy a huge quantity of goods. The utility function is separable between 
consumption and work, cross effects are not considered. 
The utility function is going to be used as an estimate of welfare of the economy in order to 
come up with the gains or losses that households would have with changes in money 
composition. Hence:  
𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡 =  ∑ 𝐸𝑡𝛽
𝑗 [
𝑐𝑡+𝑗
1−𝜚
1 − 𝜚
− Ψ
𝑛𝑡+𝑗
1+𝛾
1 + 𝛾
+ 𝑏0(1 − 𝑠𝑡+𝑗)
𝑏1]
∞
𝑗=0
 
Lastly, it must be defined a transaction cost function. The main propose of money either for 
both electronic and paper currency is to be use as a medium of exchange. Exchanging money 
for anything individuals might desire, carries a cost defined in the following function: 
ℎ𝑡(𝑐𝑡, 𝑚𝑡, 𝑠𝑡) = ℎ0 + ℎ1(
𝑐𝑡
𝑚𝑡
𝑒 + 𝑚𝑡
𝑐)
ℎ2 + ℎ3𝑠𝑡 
                                        (+, −, +) 
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This is the transaction cost function, and it is going to set the cost of any transaction in this 
model. It is defined in such a way that the cost increases as long as the consumption is higher 
because more time and money is employed on that transaction. And then, 
𝜕ℎ𝑡
𝜕𝑐𝑡
> 0, with ℎ0, 
ℎ1, ℎ2 and ℎ3 as positive coefficients. 
Alternatively, when the quantity of real money (𝑚𝑡) is higher, the cost incurred during 
transactions is lower.10 Since households have alternatives of holding value with other assets 
such as bonds or capital (as it is going to be seen), holding less money implies more income 
to transform this store of value into consumption goods. Households incur in commission 
fees, trips to banks´ ATMs, transport costs, and therefore, shopping becomes costlier. That 
is why the higher the amount of money in circulation in the economy, the lower the 
transaction costs. Thus, 
𝜕ℎ𝑡
𝜕𝑚𝑡
< 0. 
The discussion concerning if the use of paper or electronic money increases or decreases the 
cost of transaction is more complicated. Then, let´s discuss about the effect of 𝑠𝑡 on 
transaction costs.  
According to Humphrey (2010), the unit cost of transaction is different for the economic 
agents, for example for a merchant, cash is the cheapest mean of payment meanwhile for 
average consumers, credit cards, that is electronic money, it is the cheapest mean of payment. 
Bergman et al. (2007) in a research carried out for the Swedish Sveriges Riksbank claim that 
cash is the most efficient mean of payment when a payment amounts approximately eight 
euros. However, the approach considered by Humphrey is just taking into account the 
current state of art of different means of holding money. The approach of this model is 
different to the extent which the share of electronic money is changing throughout time and 
therefore, it implies a huge capital investment in electronic devices and software needed to 
carry electronic transactions in case of a huge share of electronic money is at the optimal 
equilibrium. This is why in subsection 6.2 the parameter ℎ3 is going to be changed to analyse 
its effects on the model. 
Although there already exist some technologies in order to clear person to person (P2P) 
payments such as Google Wallet, Paypal or contactless credit cards, which are in ways of 
                                                          
10 Note that  𝑚𝑡 = 𝑚𝑡
𝑒 + 𝑚𝑡
𝑐  
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improving, it is going to keep it simple it is going to be assumed that with a higher share of 
electronic money in the economy, transaction costs are going to be much higher due to the 
huge fixed investment needed at the beginning and the maintenance costs incurred. That is 
why Rogoff (2016). supports the idea of indefinitely leaving small bills and coins in 
circulation (or even just coins with a value of 10 euros or dollars), higher share of paper 
money, lower transaction costs, which is the same that we are assuming. Hence, ℎ3 is the 
parameter defining by how much transaction costs are going to be increased when the share 
of electronic money is increased and 
𝜕ℎ𝑡
𝜕𝑠𝑡
> 0 to guarantee the transaction-facilitating role of 
money. 
In conclusion, when it comes to transaction costs depending on the mean of holding money, 
there exists two effects for both paper money and electronic money. In case of paper money, 
it has negative effect, because costs are lower when more money is in circulation, and on the 
other hand, it also decreases the transaction costs because of the higher the share of paper 
money (lower 𝑠𝑡) the lower the cost. This implies that 
𝜕ℎ𝑡
𝜕𝑚𝑡
𝑐 < 0. Electronic money has two 
opposite effects. The first one is the same as paper currency, with the same effect. The 
second effect is positive with higher transaction costs when the share of electronic money is 
higher. It is assumed that first effect offsets the second and, the overall effect is negative, 
implying that 
𝜕ℎ𝑡
𝜕𝑚𝑡
𝑒 < 0.
11 
5.2 The optimizing programs 
5.2.1 Households  
Once it is known both potential benefits and downsides of holding electronically more or 
less money, the optimizing program for a representative household subject to budget 
constraints can be written as follows: 
max
𝑐𝑡,𝑛𝑡,𝑘𝑡+1,𝑏𝑡+1,𝑚𝑡
𝑒,𝑚𝑡
𝑐
∑ 𝐸𝑡𝛽
𝑗 [
𝑐𝑡+𝑗
1−𝜚
1 − 𝜚
− Ψ
𝑛𝑡+𝑗
1+𝛾
1 + 𝛾
+ 𝑏0(1 − 𝑠𝑡+𝑗)
𝑏1]
∞
𝑗=0
 
                                                          
11 This is because taking the first derivative of transaction cost respect to electronic money, the money 
effect is higher than the electronic money share effect  ℎ1ℎ2(
𝑐𝑡
𝑚𝑡
𝑒+𝑚𝑡
𝑐)
ℎ2−1(
𝑐𝑡
(𝑚𝑡
𝑒+𝑚𝑡
𝑐)2
) >
ℎ3
𝑚𝑡
𝑐
(𝑚𝑡
𝑒+𝑚𝑡
𝑐)2
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Subject to: 
(1 − 𝜏𝑡+𝑗)𝑤𝑡+𝑗𝑛𝑡+𝑗 + (1 − 𝜏𝑡+𝑗)𝑟𝑡+𝑗
𝑘 𝑘𝑡+𝑗 + 𝑔𝑡+𝑗
= 𝑐𝑡+𝑗 + [𝑘𝑡+𝑗+1 − (1 − 𝛿)𝑘𝑡+𝑗] + [(1 + 𝑟𝑡+𝑗)
−1
𝑏𝑡+1+𝑗 − 𝑏𝑡+𝑗]
+ [(𝑚𝑡+𝑗
𝑒 + 𝑚𝑡+𝑗
𝑐 ) − (1 + 𝜋𝑡+𝑗)
−1
(𝑚𝑡−1+𝑗
𝑒 + 𝑚𝑡−1+𝑗
𝑐 )] + [ℎ0
+ ℎ1(
𝑐𝑡+𝑗
𝑚𝑡+𝑗
𝑒 + 𝑚𝑡+𝑗
𝑐 )
ℎ2 + ℎ3𝑠𝑡+𝑗] 
For ∀ 𝑗 = 1, 2, … , ∞ 
All variables are expressed in real terms as they have been divided by the aggregate price 
level. 
The term 𝐸𝑡 is the rational expectation operator, which sets how expectations are evolving 
over time. Besides, 𝛽 is the discount factor of the perception of a household individual about 
de future in each period. The higher the discount, the less individuals care of future periods. 
By definition, it is: 𝛽 =
1
1+𝜌
< 1, with a positive rate of intertemporal preference 𝜌 > 0. 
In the budget constraint we can find different elements defining the sources of income of 
household individuals and different means of holding and expending these revenues either, 
goods, capital, currency (𝑚𝑡
𝑒 𝑜𝑟 𝑚𝑡
𝑐), transaction costs or assets such as bonds.  
There are three sources of income. The first one is the revenues coming from individuals 
employing 𝑛𝑡 units of time in supplying labour and earning a real wage 𝑤𝑡 per unit of time. 
Hence, the wage multiplied by labour is the total revenue from supplying labour to firms, 
and it is subject to the income tax rate 𝜏𝑡 in order to obtain the net revenues coming from 
labour.  
Households also have the opportunity of getting a return from lending capital to firms 𝑘𝑡. 
Individuals gain 𝑟𝑡
𝑘for any unit of capital supplied in period t, which gives a gross profit of 
𝑟𝑡
𝑘 times 𝑘𝑡. This is also subject to the same income tax rate as labour to obtain the net return 
coming from lending capital goods to the firms. The last source of income is the government 
transfers denoted as 𝑔𝑡. 
Households can spend their revenue on different uses, which are represented on the right-
hand side of the budget constraint. The first one is the consumption of goods 𝑐𝑡 which are 
produced by firms and sold in the competitive goods market.  
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The following three terms could be understood as the portfolio choice where individuals can 
decide how to allocate their wealth. First, the amount of capital goods they are deciding to 
acquire next period 𝑘𝑡+1, minus the amount of capital they are currently holding that needs 
to get subtracted the depreciation rate (usage rate) 𝛿. That is the net amount capital that is 
going to be increased this period. Next, it is found the amount of wealth that individuals 
decide to hold in bonds in the next period 𝑏𝑡+1, which need to be divided by the real interest 
rate (1 + 𝑟𝑡) that bonds are yielding, in order to have it in present-period terms. The quantity 
of bonds 𝑏𝑡 is subtracted to the amount of bonds individuals are deciding to hold next 
period, to obtain the net purchases of bond assets. Lastly, individuals can also allocate their 
wealth increasing the quantity of real money (either electronic or paper), taking into account 
the real money held in period t-1 suffers from a lower purchasing power, and that is why it 
is divided by the price inflation rate (1 + 𝜋𝑡). 
Finally, the transaction cost bore by individuals when they purchase consumption goods 
using money as a medium of exchange is the last use of households spending. 
In order to maximize the utility function, the Lagrangian function is written in the following 
way: 
ℒ𝑡(𝑐𝑡, 𝑛𝑡 , 𝑘𝑡+1,𝑏𝑡+1,𝑚𝑡
𝑒, 𝑚𝑡
𝑐)
= ∑ 𝐸𝑡𝛽
𝑗 [
𝑐𝑡+𝑗
1−𝜚
1 − 𝜚
− Ψ
𝑛𝑡+𝑗
1+𝛾
1 + 𝛾
+ 𝑏0(1 − 𝑠𝑡+𝑗)
𝑏1
∞
𝑗=0
+  𝜆𝑡+𝑗 [(1 − 𝜏𝑡+𝑗)𝑤𝑡+𝑗𝑛𝑡+𝑗 + (1 − 𝜏𝑡+𝑗)𝑟𝑡+𝑗
𝑘 𝑘𝑡+𝑗 + 𝑔𝑡+𝑗 − 𝑐𝑡+𝑗
− [𝑘𝑡+𝑗+1 − (1 − 𝛿)𝑘𝑡+𝑗] − [(1 + 𝑟𝑡+𝑗)
−1
𝑏𝑡+1+𝑗 − 𝑏𝑡+𝑗]
− [(𝑚𝑡+𝑗
𝑒 + 𝑚𝑡+𝑗
𝑐 ) − (1 + 𝜋𝑡+𝑗)
−1
(𝑚𝑡−1+𝑗
𝑒 + 𝑚𝑡−1+𝑗
𝑐 )] − [ℎ0
+ ℎ1(
𝑐𝑡+𝑗
𝑚𝑡+𝑗
𝑒 + 𝑚𝑡+𝑗
𝑐 )
ℎ2 + ℎ3𝑠𝑡+𝑗]]] 
The first order conditions are computed as the partial derivative of the Lagrangian function 
with respect to the choice variables. The consumption first order condition is: 
𝜕ℒ𝑡
𝜕𝑐𝑡
=  𝑐𝑡
−𝜚
− 𝜆𝑡 − 𝜆𝑡ℎ1ℎ2 (
𝑐𝑡
𝑚𝑡
𝑒 + 𝑚𝑡
𝑐)
ℎ2−1
(
1
𝑚𝑡
𝑒 + 𝑚𝑡
𝑐) = 0 
23 
 
Where 𝜆𝑡 that is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the budget constraint in period t, 
solving for 𝜆𝑡 leads to the shadow value of consumption
12: 
𝜆𝑡 =
𝑐𝑡
−𝜚
1 + ℎ𝑐𝑡
 
This shadow value tells us the marginal impact or increase of consumption in the utility 
function divided by the marginal transaction cost of one more unit of consumption, which 
has sense because individuals must incur in transaction costs when they purchase goods. 
Then, the shadow price gathers the total variation of one more unit of consumption on the 
optimal solution of the maximizing problem. First order condition with respect to labour is: 
𝜕ℒ𝑡
𝜕𝑛𝑡
= −Ψ𝑛𝑡
𝛾 + 𝜆𝑡(1 − 𝜏𝑡)𝑤𝑡 = 0 
By plotting 𝜆𝑡 above it is get that: 
Ψ𝑛𝑡
𝛾 =
𝑐𝑡
−𝜚
1 + ℎ𝑐𝑡
(1 − 𝜏𝑡)𝑤𝑡 
This leads to an equilibrium condition that equalizes the marginal utility of labour to the 
Lagrange multiplier times the net real wage. So, what does it happen if the quantity of 
electronic money in this economy increases? Undoubtedly, a higher 𝑠𝑡 reduces the income 
tax rate. Therefore, individuals will pay less taxes and will dispose of more net real wage to 
consume goods, which increases the labour that individuals supply. If the negative marginal 
utility of labour is lower than the net return of labour, people would work more because of 
the availability of enjoying more income without decreasing the utility function by a big 
amount. 
Then, if it is solved for 𝑛𝑡 , it can be seen the labour supply function: 
𝑛𝑡 = [
1
Ψ
 
𝑐𝑡
−𝜚
1 + ℎ𝑐𝑡
(1 − 𝜏𝑡)𝑤𝑡]
1
𝛾
 
The First Order Conditions for bonds and capital in period t+1 are the following: 
                                                          
12 Let us define ℎ𝑐𝑡 =
𝜕ℎ𝑡
𝜕𝑐𝑡
= ℎ1ℎ2 (
𝑐𝑡
𝑚𝑡
𝑒+𝑚𝑡
𝑐)
ℎ2−1
(
1
𝑚𝑡
𝑒+𝑚𝑡
𝑐) 
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𝜕ℒ𝑡
𝜕𝑏𝑡+1
= −𝜆𝑡(1 + 𝑟𝑡)
−1 + 𝛽𝐸𝑡𝜆𝑡+1 = 0 
𝜕ℒ𝑡
𝜕𝑘𝑡+1
=  𝛽𝐸𝑡𝜆𝑡+1(1 − 𝜏𝑡)𝑟𝑡
𝑘−𝜆𝑡 +  𝛽𝐸𝑡𝜆𝑡+1(1 − 𝛿) = 0 
Putting together both First Order Conditions, it is obtained: 
𝜆𝑡(1 + 𝑟𝑡)
−1(1 − 𝜏𝑡)𝑟𝑡
𝑘 +  𝜆𝑡(1 + 𝑟𝑡)
−1(1 − 𝛿) = 𝜆𝑡 
And solving for 𝑟𝑡: 
𝑟𝑡 = (1 − 𝜏𝑡)𝑟𝑡
𝑘 − 𝛿 
This equation is important because it shows that the net return (after taxes and minus 
depreciation) coming from the use of capital (right-hand side) and the bond or financial asset 
real interest rate must be the same.  
From the bonds´ First Order Condition it is obtained the consumption Euler equation13 that 
is the optimal intertemporal allocation of consumption in period t and t+1: 
𝑐𝑡
−𝜚
(1 + ℎ𝑐𝑡)(1 + 𝑟𝑡)
=  𝛽𝐸𝑡
𝑐𝑡+1
−𝜚
1 + ℎ𝑐𝑡+1
 
The relation with the bond First Order Condition is that bonds represent the future 
consumption of goods and they are similar to savings, since they serve as a store of value 
that yields 𝑟𝑡, and that is why the consumption in period t is divided by the interest rate of 
bonds. These bonds are borrowed by individuals by the government. In case the effect of 
consumption in the utility is higher in period t than in period t+1, the 𝑐𝑡 increases in 
exchange for less bonds in period t+1, that means less savings in period t+1 and therefore 
𝑐𝑡+1 turns lower. The opposite effect happens when consumption in period t+1 is higher 
than the consumption in period t. Therefore, the consumption marginal utility is penalized 
twice, when a purchase of goods is done through transaction cost and with the opportunity 
cost of not transforming money into bonds. The First Order Conditions with respect to 
electronic real money and real currency are as they follow:14 
                                                          
13 Note that 𝜆𝑡+1 =  
𝑐𝑡+1
−𝜚
1+ℎ𝑐𝑡+1
 
14 Let´s use the following definitions: 𝑠𝑚𝑡𝑒 =
𝜕𝑠𝑡
𝜕𝑚𝑡
𝑐 =
−𝑚𝑡
𝑒
(𝑚𝑡
𝑒+𝑚𝑡
𝑐)2
= 𝑠𝑚𝑡𝑐 ; 
𝜕𝑠𝑡
𝜕𝑚𝑡
𝑒 =
𝑚𝑡
𝑐
(𝑚𝑡
𝑒+𝑚𝑡
𝑐)2
; 
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𝜕ℒ𝑡
𝜕𝑚𝑡
𝑒 = −𝑏0𝑏1(1 − 𝑠𝑡)
𝑏1−1
𝑚𝑡
𝑐
(𝑚𝑡
𝑒 + 𝑚𝑡
𝑐)2
+ 𝜆𝑡𝜏1
𝑚𝑡
𝑐
(𝑚𝑡
𝑒 + 𝑚𝑡
𝑐)2
(𝑤𝑡𝑛𝑡 + 𝑟𝑡
𝑘𝑘𝑡) − 𝜆𝑡
+ 𝐸𝑡𝛽𝜆𝑡+1(1 + 𝜋𝑡+1)
−1
− 𝜆𝑡 [ℎ1ℎ2 (
𝑐𝑡
𝑚𝑡
𝑒 + 𝑚𝑡
𝑐)
ℎ2−1
(
−𝑐𝑡
(𝑚𝑡
𝑒 + 𝑚𝑡
𝑐)2
) + ℎ3
𝑚𝑡
𝑐
(𝑚𝑡
𝑒 + 𝑚𝑡
𝑐)2
] = 0 
𝜕ℒ𝑡
𝜕𝑚𝑡
𝑐 = −𝑏0𝑏1(1 − 𝑠𝑡)
𝑏1−1
−𝑚𝑡
𝑒
(𝑚𝑡
𝑒 + 𝑚𝑡
𝑐)2
+ 𝜆𝑡𝜏1
−𝑚𝑡
𝑒
(𝑚𝑡
𝑒 + 𝑚𝑡
𝑐)2
(𝑤𝑡𝑛𝑡 + 𝑟𝑡
𝑘𝑘𝑡) − 𝜆𝑡
+ 𝐸𝑡𝛽𝜆𝑡+1(1 + 𝜋𝑡+1)
−1
− 𝜆𝑡 [ℎ1ℎ2 (
𝑐𝑡
𝑚𝑡
𝑒 + 𝑚𝑡
𝑐)
ℎ2−1
(
−𝑐𝑡
(𝑚𝑡
𝑒 + 𝑚𝑡
𝑐)2
) + ℎ3
−𝑚𝑡
𝑒
(𝑚𝑡
𝑒 + 𝑚𝑡
𝑐)2
] = 0 
The First Order Condition taken from electronic real money combined with that of bonds 
leads to the demand of electronic real money:15 
𝑐𝑡
−𝜚
1 + ℎ𝑐𝑡
𝜏1𝑠𝑚𝑡𝑒(𝑤𝑡𝑛𝑡 + 𝑟𝑡
𝑘𝑘𝑡) −
𝑐𝑡
−𝜚
1 + ℎ𝑐𝑡
ℎ𝑚𝑡𝑒 = 𝑏0𝑏1(1 − 𝑠𝑡)
𝑏1−1𝑠𝑚𝑡𝑒 +
𝑐𝑡
−𝜚
1 + ℎ𝑐𝑡
(
𝑅𝑡
1 + 𝑅𝑡
) 
Besides, applying analogous steps, the paper real money demand function obtained in period 
t is: 
−𝑏0𝑏1(1 − 𝑠𝑡)
𝑏1−1𝑠𝑚𝑡𝑐 −
𝑐𝑡
−𝜚
1 + ℎ𝑐𝑡
ℎ𝑚𝑡𝑐 = −
𝑐𝑡
−𝜚
1 + ℎ𝑐𝑡
𝜏1𝑠𝑚𝑡𝑐(𝑤𝑡𝑛𝑡 + 𝑟𝑡
𝑘𝑘𝑡) +
𝑐𝑡
−𝜚
1 + ℎ𝑐𝑡
(
𝑅𝑡
1 + 𝑅𝑡
) 
It can be observed from the two last equations that the right-hand side represents the gains 
of using either paper or electronic money and the left-hand side represents the losses coming 
from the use of each kind of holding money. 
By the electronic money demand function, it can be concluded that it has two gains. The 
first one has to do with the gains of paying less income taxes from capital and labour when 
                                                          
ℎ𝑚𝑡𝑐 =
𝜕ℎ𝑡
𝜕𝑚𝑡
𝑐 = ℎ1ℎ2 (
𝑐𝑡
𝑚𝑡
𝑒+𝑚𝑡
𝑐)
ℎ2−1
(
−𝑐𝑡
(𝑚𝑡
𝑒+𝑚𝑡
𝑐)2
) + ℎ3
−𝑚𝑡
𝑒
(𝑚𝑡
𝑒+𝑚𝑡
𝑐)2
 ;                                                      
ℎ𝑚𝑡𝑒 =
𝜕ℎ𝑡
𝜕𝑚𝑡
𝑒 = ℎ1ℎ2 (
𝑐𝑡
𝑚𝑡
𝑒+𝑚𝑡
𝑐)
ℎ2−1
(
−𝑐𝑡
(𝑚𝑡
𝑒+𝑚𝑡
𝑐)2
) + ℎ3
𝑚𝑡
𝑐
(𝑚𝑡
𝑒+𝑚𝑡
𝑐)2
 
 
 
15 In order to get to (
𝑅𝑡
1+𝑅𝑡
) term, note that 𝑅𝑡 is the nominal interest rate and in this model, it is 
assumed that the Fisher effect holds. that is: (1 + 𝑅𝑡) = (1 + 𝑟𝑡)𝐸𝑡(1 + 𝜋𝑡) where 𝑟𝑡 is the real 
interest rate and 𝜋𝑡 is the inflation rate. 
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the share of electronic money increases and as it is already known, the income tax rate 
decreases. The second gain it is commonly shared with paper money, so regardless of its 
nature it simply states that the use of money either cash or electronic, decreases transaction 
costs significantly16. When it comes to losses associated to the use of electronic money, the 
first one is the marginal utility loss of it due to the loss of privacy that electronic money 
generates. The last term, is a loss that does not depend on the kind of money that individuals 
are holding. The latter is the opportunity cost that individuals bear because of holding money 
instead of investing it on other assets such as capital or bonds. The opportunity cost is (
𝑅𝑡
1+𝑅𝑡
), 
that is the nominal return of bonds expressed at face value, at period t. This is an opportunity cost 
because by consuming more goods in period t, individuals´ utility increases, as bonds have a 
yield differential of 
𝑅𝑡
1+𝑅𝑡
 with respect to the 0% money return. 
Likewise, the paper money demand function has similar structure. The common advantages 
or disadvantages of money are the same as electronic money, lower transaction costs due to 
the use of money as medium of exchange and the opportunity cost associated to holding 
money. However, the use of paper money has the disadvantage of paying more taxes from 
income.17 On the other hand, the marginal utility of paper money is positive, and increasing 
the share of paper money results in a higher utility for individuals. 
In conclusion, apart from the common properties of both paper and electronic money, the 
benefits related to holding paper money are the drawbacks of electronic money and vice 
versa. Therefore, a trade-off between both types of money is faced, and an optimal quantity 
of money as well as the optimal share of electronic money in the model must be found. 
Then, if both money demand functions are considered, it is obtained the demand for 
electronic money share:18 
𝑠𝑡 = 1 − [
𝑐𝑡
−𝜚
1 + ℎ𝑐𝑡
(
𝜏1(𝑤𝑡𝑛𝑡 + 𝑟𝑡
𝑘𝑘𝑡) − ℎ3
𝑏0𝑏1
)]
1
𝑏1−1
 
This is the optimal share of electronic money in the economy in period t. It must be 
considered that it is only the optimal quantity of electronic money relative to the total amount 
                                                          
16 Recall that ℎ𝑚𝑡𝑒 < 0 by assumption 
17 Recall that: 𝑠𝑚𝑡𝑐 < 0 and ℎ𝑚𝑡𝑐 < 0 by assumption. 
18 To reach to this, notice that: 𝑠𝑚𝑡𝑒 − 𝑠𝑚𝑡𝑐 = ℎ𝑚𝑡𝑒 − ℎ𝑚𝑡𝑐 =
1
𝑚𝑡
𝑒+𝑚𝑡
𝑐 
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of money and not the optimal quantity of any kind of money. The latter, basically shows how 
the share of electronic money is affected by several factors. Affecting positively, it is found 
the gain from paying less taxes and the Lagrange multiplier, and negatively, the increase in 
transaction costs, ℎ3, and the negative effect on the utility function due to loss of anonymity 
and the increase of authorities control. 
Since the Fisher relationship holds, it is known that in this economy the nominal interest rate 
in period t 𝑅𝑡 is equal to the real interest rate in period t subject to inflation in period t: 
(1 + 𝑅𝑡) = (1 + 𝑟𝑡)𝐸𝑡(1 + 𝜋𝑡+1) 
Note that 𝜋𝑡+1 is the next-period inflation rate. The current inflation rate 𝜋𝑡 is assumed to 
be equal to the rate of growth of the monetary base t 𝜇𝑡, since it is known that in the long-
run equilibrium money growth is strongly associated with inflation19. Thus: 
𝜇𝑡 =
𝑀𝑡
𝑀𝑡−1
− 1 = 𝜋𝑡 
5.2.2 Firms 
In this economy, firms are economic agents producing an amount of output 𝑦𝑡, with two 
inputs that borrow from households, labour 𝑛𝑡 and capital 𝑘𝑡 to be combined with the 
available production technology. Moreover, firms are demanding some amounts of these 
two inputs in order to maximize profits and are paying 𝑤𝑡 per unit of labour and 𝑟𝑡
𝑘 per unit 
of capital.  
Firms will maximize profits subject to a production constraint that is a Cobb-Douglas 
function. The latter will work as Production Possibility Frontier (PPF): 
max
𝑛𝑡, 𝑘𝑡
   𝑦𝑡 − 𝑤𝑡𝑛𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡
𝑘𝑘𝑡 
Subject to: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑘𝑡
𝛼𝑛𝑡
1−𝛼 
The main objective of maximizing profit firms is to get the demand functions for both labour 
and capital. The Lagrange function in period t is: 
                                                          
19 The trend component in Consumer Price Index inflation is entirely due to the growth component of 
monetary base growth. i. e. (Benati 2005) and (Crowder 1998). 
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ℒ𝑡(𝑛𝑡, 𝑘𝑡) = 𝑦𝑡 − 𝑤𝑡𝑛𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡
𝑘𝑘𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡(𝑦𝑡 − 𝑘𝑡
𝛼𝑛𝑡
1−𝛼) 
The First Order Conditions for labour and capital demand are: 
𝜕ℒ𝑡
𝜕𝑛𝑡
= −𝑤𝑡 − 𝜆𝑡(1 − 𝛼)𝑘𝑡
𝛼𝑛𝑡
−𝛼 = 0 
𝜕ℒ𝑡
𝜕𝑘𝑡
= −𝑟𝑡
𝑘 − 𝜆𝑡𝛼𝑘𝑡
𝛼−1𝑛𝑡
1−𝛼 = 0 
From this maximization process it can be taken that in equilibrium, the marginal revenue for 
either capital or labour must be equal to its marginal productivity: 
𝑤𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼)
𝑦𝑡
𝑛𝑡
 
𝑟𝑡
𝑘 =  𝛼
𝑦𝑡
𝑘𝑡
 
This a condition that must be satisfied if firms want to maximize profits. The cost of labour 
𝑤𝑡 cannot be higher than the revenue that the firm gets with that increase in labour. The 
same happens with the cost of capital 𝑟𝑡
𝑘 for firms. Therefore, firms must hire workers and 
borrow labour until the cost for the firm is equal to the revenue they get from employing 
these inputs. 
5.2.3 Government constraint 
Last but not least, it is needed to be found the overall resources constraint of this economy. 
This constraint captures together, the household budget constraint and the government 
budget constraint. The government is responsible of issuing bonds and money and collecting 
taxes in period t. Therefore, 𝑔𝑡 is financed as follows: 
𝑔𝑡 = (1 + 𝑟𝑡)
−1𝑏𝑡+1 − 𝑏𝑡 + 𝑚𝑡 − (1 + 𝜋𝑡)
−1𝑚𝑡−1 + 𝜏𝑡(𝑤𝑡𝑛𝑡 + 𝑟𝑡
𝑘𝑘𝑡) 
The government can get itself indebted by issuing bonds in period t, (1 + 𝑟𝑡)
−1𝑏𝑡+1 − 𝑏𝑡, 
that is the variation of bonds from period t-1 to t. The second way to get financed is by 
money creation, where the term 𝑚𝑡 − (1 + 𝜋𝑡)
−1𝑚𝑡−1, is the money created in period t, 
that is the total monetary base change from period t-1 to period t. The last term shows the 
income coming from the collection of taxes in period t. The government income tax rate is 
exerted over income from labour 𝑤𝑡𝑛𝑡 and capital 𝑟𝑡
𝑘𝑘𝑡. 
Plugging 𝑔𝑡 on the household budget constraint, it can be easily taken the overall resources 
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constraint:  
(𝑤𝑡𝑛𝑡 + 𝑟𝑡
𝑘𝑘𝑡) = 𝑐𝑡 + 𝑘𝑡+1 − (1 − 𝛿)𝑘𝑡 + ℎ𝑡 
Since it is known that 𝑤𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼)
𝑦𝑡
𝑛𝑡
 and 𝑟𝑡
𝑘 =  𝛼
𝑦𝑡
𝑘𝑡
 hold in equilibrium, the production 
in this economy is going to be the following: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑐𝑡 + 𝑘𝑡+1 − (1 − 𝛿)𝑘𝑡 + ℎ𝑡 
5.3 Competitive equilibrium: The Steady-State solution 
After presenting and explaining the whole model, a system of 21 equations with 21 different 
variables has been obtained that need to be expressed in the steady-state solution. These 21 
equations contain the 21 variables to be found: 
𝑛𝑡 , 𝑐𝑡, ℎ𝑐𝑡 , 𝜏𝑡, 𝑤𝑡, 𝑟𝑡
𝑘, 𝑟𝑡, 𝑠𝑚𝑡𝑒 , 𝑘𝑡 , ℎ𝑚𝑡𝑒 , 𝑠𝑡, 𝑅𝑡, 𝑠𝑚𝑡𝑐 , ℎ𝑚𝑡𝑐 , 𝑦𝑡, 𝑚𝑡, 𝑚𝑡
𝑒 , 𝑚𝑡
𝑐, 𝜆𝑡, ℎ𝑡  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡 
Although the general competitive equilibrium could be solved using either a dynamic model 
or a steady-state (deterministic) model, the steady state equilibrium is the most suitable 
methodology to follow for the main proposition of this paper. Since this paper aims to find 
the long-run optimal quantity of electronic money circulating in an economy, this is going to 
be solved into a steady-state form. This implies that variables in period t are going to be the 
same in every period, so there is no growth and that the technology progress is constant over 
time. There does not exist uncertainty, and that everything that can happen in between is 
known since the long-run is the only thing that matters. The model is going to be solved 
using MATLAB software. It is also going to be used for the different simulations of the 
model parameters. Table 1 contains the 21 equations expressed in the General Competitive 
form and transformed into the Steady-State Competitive form. 
Table 1 General Competitive Equilibrium in the short-run and in the long-run. 
Dynamic Equilibrium (short-run) Steady-State Equilibrium (long-run) 
𝑛𝑡 = [
1
Ψ
 𝜆𝑡(1 − 𝜏𝑡)𝑤𝑡]
1
𝛾
 𝑛 = [
1
Ψ
 𝜆(1 − 𝜏)𝑤]
1
𝛾
 
𝑟𝑡 = (1 − 𝜏𝑡)𝑟𝑡
𝑘 − 𝛿 𝑟 = (1 − 𝜏)𝑟𝑘 − 𝛿 
𝑐𝑡
−𝜚
(1 + ℎ𝑐𝑡)(1 + 𝑟𝑡)
=  𝛽𝐸𝑡
𝑐𝑡+1
−𝜚
1 + ℎ𝑐𝑡+1
 
𝑟 = 𝜌 
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𝜆𝑡𝜏1𝑠𝑚𝑡𝑒(𝑤𝑡𝑛𝑡 + 𝑟𝑡
𝑘𝑘𝑡) − 𝜆𝑡ℎ𝑚𝑡𝑒
= 𝑏0𝑏1(1 − 𝑠𝑡)
𝑏1−1𝑠𝑚𝑡𝑒
+ 𝜆𝑡 (
𝑅𝑡
1 + 𝑅𝑡
) 
𝜆𝜏1𝑠𝑚𝑒(𝑤𝑛 + 𝑟
𝑘𝑘) − 𝜆ℎ𝑚𝑒
= 𝑏0𝑏1(1 − 𝑠)
𝑏1−1𝑠𝑚𝑒
+ 𝜆 (
𝑅
1 + 𝑅
) 
−𝑏0𝑏1(1 − 𝑠𝑡)
𝑏1−1𝑠𝑚𝑡𝑐 − 𝜆𝑡ℎ𝑚𝑡𝑐
= −𝜆𝑡𝜏1𝑠𝑚𝑡𝑐(𝑤𝑡𝑛𝑡 + 𝑟𝑡
𝑘𝑘𝑡)
+ 𝜆𝑡 (
𝑅𝑡
1 + 𝑅𝑡
) 
−𝑏0𝑏1(1 − 𝑠)
𝑏1−1𝑠𝑚𝑐 − 𝜆ℎ𝑚𝑐
= −𝜆𝜏1𝑠𝑚𝑐(𝑤𝑛 + 𝑟
𝑘𝑘)
+ 𝜆 (
𝑅
1 + 𝑅
) 
𝑤𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼)
𝑦𝑡
𝑛𝑡
 𝑤 = (1 − 𝛼)
𝑦
𝑛
 
𝑟𝑡
𝑘 =  𝛼
𝑦𝑡
𝑘𝑡
 𝑟𝑘 =  𝛼
𝑦
𝑘
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑘𝑡
𝛼𝑛𝑡
1−𝛼 𝑦 = 𝑘𝛼𝑛1−𝛼 
ℎ𝑐𝑡 = ℎ1ℎ2 (
𝑐𝑡
𝑚𝑡
)
ℎ2−1
(
1
𝑚𝑡
) ℎ𝑐 = ℎ1ℎ2 (
𝑐
𝑚
)
ℎ2−1
(
1
𝑚
) 
𝜏𝑡 = 𝜏0 − 𝜏1𝑠𝑡 𝜏 = 𝜏0 − 𝜏1𝑠 
𝑠𝑚𝑡𝑐 =
−𝑚𝑡
𝑒
(𝑚𝑡)2
 𝑠𝑚𝑐 =
−𝑚𝑒
(𝑚)2
 
𝑠𝑚𝑡𝑒 =
𝑚𝑡
𝑐
(𝑚𝑡)2
 𝑠𝑚𝑒 =
𝑚𝑐
(𝑚)2
 
ℎ𝑚𝑡𝑐 =  ℎ1ℎ2 (
𝑐𝑡
𝑚𝑡
)
ℎ2−1
(
−𝑐𝑡
(𝑚𝑡)2
) + ℎ3
−𝑚𝑡
𝑒
(𝑚𝑡)2
 ℎ𝑚𝑐 =  ℎ1ℎ2 (
𝑐
𝑚
)
ℎ2−1
(
−𝑐
(𝑚)2
) + ℎ3
−𝑚𝑒
(𝑚)2
 
ℎ𝑚𝑡𝑒 = ℎ1ℎ2 (
𝑐𝑡
𝑚𝑡
)
ℎ2−1
(
−𝑐𝑡
(𝑚𝑡)2
) + ℎ3
𝑚𝑡
𝑐
(𝑚𝑡)2
 ℎ𝑚𝑒 = ℎ1ℎ2 (
𝑐
𝑚
)
ℎ2−1
(
−𝑐
(𝑚)2
) + ℎ3
𝑚𝑐
(𝑚)2
 
ℎ𝑡 = ℎ0 + ℎ1(
𝑐𝑡
𝑚𝑡
)ℎ2 + ℎ3𝑠𝑡 ℎ = ℎ0 + ℎ1(
𝑐
𝑀
)ℎ2 + ℎ3𝑠 
𝑚𝑡 = 𝑚𝑡
𝑒 + 𝑚𝑡
𝑐 𝑚 = 𝑚𝑒 + 𝑚𝑐 
𝑠𝑡 =
𝑚𝑡
𝑒
𝑚𝑡
𝑒 + 𝑚𝑡
𝑐 =  
𝑚𝑡
𝑒
𝑚𝑡
 𝑠 =  
𝑚𝑒
𝑚
 
𝜆𝑡 =
𝑐𝑡
−𝜚
1 + ℎ𝑐𝑡
 𝜆 =
𝑐−𝜚
1 + ℎ𝑐
 
(1 + 𝑅𝑡) = (1 + 𝑟𝑡)𝐸𝑡(1 + 𝜋𝑡) (1 + 𝑅) = (1 + 𝑟)(1 + 𝜋) 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑐𝑡 + 𝑘𝑡+1 − (1 − 𝛿)𝑘𝑡 + ℎ𝑡 𝑦 = 𝑐 +  𝛿𝑘 + ℎ 
𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡 =  ∑ 𝐸𝑡𝛽
𝑗 [
𝑐𝑡+𝑗
1−𝜚
1 − 𝜚
− Ψ
𝑛𝑡+𝑗
1+𝛾
1 + 𝛾
∞
𝑗=0
+ 𝑏0(1 − 𝑠𝑡+𝑗)
𝑏1] 
𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 =
1
1 − 𝛽
[
𝑐1−𝜚
1 − 𝜚
− Ψ
𝑛1+𝛾
1 + 𝛾
+ 𝑏0(1 − 𝑠)
𝑏1] 
Source: Own Elaboration 
Additionally, the model counts with 15 parameters, which are going to be calibrated next 
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based on different criteria in order to solve for each variable. 
5.4 Baseline calibration 
The main objective of the baseline calibration is to define the parameters, so they can 
replicate a representative economy. Once, the baseline calibration, the parameters defining 
the behaviour of the model can be modified to analyse the effects on an economy. The 
calibration of the model is needed mainly in the specific parameters that have been 
introduced by the model, 𝜏1, 𝑏0, 𝑏1, ℎ0, ℎ1, ℎ2 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ℎ3. The rest of parameters are non-
specific parameters of this model. 
The model parameters have been calibrated to replicate data from the US economy taken 
from FRED database. The US economy has been chosen because of the wide availability of 
economic data. The calibration assumes a time period of one year.  
Table 2: Baseline Calibration of parameters 
Ψ = 0.4820 𝛼 = 0.36 𝜏1 = 0.035 
𝛿 = 0.08 𝜚 = 1.5 𝑏0 = 0.02 
𝜋 = 0.03 = 𝜇 𝛾 = 2 𝑏1 = 0.75 
𝜌 = 0.015 ℎ0 = 0.01 ℎ1 = 0.01 
𝜏0 = 0.35 ℎ2 = 2.25 ℎ3 = 0.02 
Source: Own elaboration. 
This calibration leads to the following results for each of the twenty-one variables: 
Table 3: Steady-State solution in baseline calibration 
𝑛 = 1 𝑠𝑚𝑒 = 0.1176 𝑦 = 1.7044 
𝑐 = 1.3059 𝑘 = 4.3982 𝑚 = 0.9823 
ℎ𝑐 = 0.0327 ℎ𝑚𝑒 = −0.0411 𝑚
𝑒 = 0.8688 
𝜏 = 0.3190 𝑠 = 0.8845 𝑚𝑐 = 0.1134 
𝑤 = 1.0908 𝑅 = 0.0455 𝜆 = 0.6489 
𝑟𝑘 = 0.1395 𝑠𝑚𝑐 = −0.9005 ℎ = 0.0467 
𝑟 = 0.0150 ℎ𝑚𝑐 = −0.0615 𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 =  −129.0303 
Source: Own elaboration. Results from MATLAB 
The non-specific parameters have been calibrated as any other real business cycle papers in 
the literature.20 It is important to notice that 𝛿 sets the yearly depreciation of capital, and that 
                                                          
20 See Casares (2007). 
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is why its value is higher than other papers that usually set its value as a quarterly depreciation. 
𝜌 is set so the perception that individuals have from the next period is 𝛽 =
1
1+0.015
= 0.985, 
that is the utility discount factor for period 𝑡 + 1. Besides, since 𝜌 = 0.015, it implies that 
the real annual interest rate, 𝑟 in this model is 1.5%. 
In case of Ψ, it has been calibrated in order to obtain that the labour supply is normalized at 
1.00 in the baseline steady-state solution. 
On the other hand, 𝜏1 has been set, so in the steady-state solution, the share of electronic 
money decreases the income tax rate by approximately 3%, which would be quite realistic. It 
has also been considered that by setting that value, the income tax rate cannot be lowered 
more than 3.5%, which would happen in a corner solution, 𝑠 = 1, which corresponds to a 
cashless economy. 
The transaction cost function is going to be calibrated considering that this function 
represents the state of art of transactions technology, which is going to be important when 
setting the value of ℎ3. The fixed transaction cost ℎ0 is calibrated to 0.01, so in the steady-
state solution, the total transaction cost is a reasonable percentage over the real output. This 
ratio is 
ℎ
𝑦
, which happens to be 2.74%. The scale parameter ℎ1 has been calibrated to bring a 
ratio 
𝑚
𝑦
 at 0.57 in the steady-state solution, which approximates to the average ratio of the 
US economy from 1980 to 2017, being 𝑚 the monetary aggregate, M221 in real terms, and y 
is the real GDP. This average happens to be 0.54 and 0.57 in the model.22 Besides, ℎ2 is 2.25 
so the convexity in the transaction cost function is moderate and it also holds stable the ratio 
of real money stock to real output. Finally, ℎ3 has been set to 0.02. This parameter is a bit 
difficult to calibrate because of its meaning. It is important to notice that it is a positive value, 
because the model starts from the assumption that the existence of more electronic money 
incurs in higher costs such as investment in new technology and new capital (new apps, new 
hardware, new security systems…) as well as its maintenance and replacement of devices. 
Both sign and impact of this parameter is going to be analysed later.  In the baseline 
                                                          
21 M2 is preferred over M1 because it is the narrowest concept of money and M2 clusters more liquid assets 
that can be understood as electronic money, such as savings deposits, small-denomination time deposits and 
balances in retail money market mutual funds. 
22 The way to calibrate this parameter has been taken from Casares et al. (2018). 
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calibration, ℎ3 leads to having the transaction cost that has to do with electronic money is 
close to 35% of total transaction costs, that is the ratio 
ℎ3𝑠
ℎ
= 0.37. 
The parameter 𝑏0 has a value so the disutility of electronic money or utility of paper money, 
(the Big Brother effect), is close to 0.25% of the utility coming from consumption. Then the 
ratio 
𝑏0(1−𝑠)
𝑏1
𝑐1−𝜚
1−𝜚
 is 0.22%, which it is considered the big brother effect is significantly less 
important for the wellbeing of individuals than consumption or labour. The concavity, 𝑏1 
has been set to 0.75 in order to be moderate too.  
Additionally, the model replicates and approximates to other ratios of the US economy. 
According to the data available in FRED, the average historical ratio (1 −
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑖𝑛 𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑀2
) from 1984 to 2017 should not vary too much from the model of this 
paper, that is the variable 𝑠. The real ratio is 89% whereas in the baseline calibration, 𝑠 takes 
the value of 88.45% which is a good approximation to the optimal share of electronic money. 
Similarly, the model is also close to the average ratio obtained from FRED, deflated currency 
in circulation to real GDP, 
𝑚𝑐
𝑦
. The real ratio is 5.67%, and in the model, it is 6.65%.  
Finally, the ratio 
𝛿𝑘
𝑦
 has been thought to be 20.64% and the stock of capital, 𝑘 is 
approximately 2.5 times real output, 𝑦. Notice that 𝜇 is going to be treated as an exogenous 
variable in the model, so is it inflation. Inflation has been set to 3% per year, which is close 
to the average US annual inflation from 1968 to 2018. 
6. Model simulations and analysis 
In this section of this paper, the model is going to be deeply analysed, that aims to see how 
changes in different parameters in the baseline calibration is going to change the results of 
the model through several simulations from MATLAB. 
First 𝜏1 is going to be modified from 0.0266 to 0.071, changing 0.0025 each movement. 
Second, ℎ3 is going to change from -0.0275 to 0.0345, increasing by 0.005 apart from -0.029 
and 0.0327 because these latter values are close to the corner solutions of s, either 1 or 0. 
Eventually, the behaviour of the model with inflation changes due to a different monetary 
policy target is going to be seen, moving 𝜋 = 𝜇 from -0.01477 to 0.08. Since welfare is 
measured in terms of utility, the permanent loss can be expressed in terms of consumption 
34 
 
because it is a better proxy for a real economy. For this, the consumption equivalence 𝑐𝑒 is 
defined as follows23: 
𝑐𝑒 = [(𝑤𝑒𝑙
max(1 − 𝛽)) + Ψ
𝑛1+𝛾
1 + 𝛾
− 𝑏0(1 − 𝑠)
𝑏1)(1 − 𝜚)]
1
1−𝜚
 
The latter contains the fixed variable 𝑤𝑒𝑙max that is calculated as the maximum welfare 
reached when the parameters are altered. Values for 𝑛 and 𝑠 differ depending on the point 
of the simulation that the loss wants to be estimated. The percentage permanent and annual 
will be computed as percentage of output in the following way: 
𝑐𝑒 − 𝑐
𝑦
· 100 
Where 𝑐 and 𝑦 are the steady-state values of consumption and real output at the point of the 
simulation where the loss wants to be estimated. 
6.1 Tax evasion effect 
The aim of this sub-section is to see what happens to different variables when the negative 
impact of the electronic money share on income tax rate is changed. This can be measured 
by an increase of 𝜏1, that paper money decreases and electronic money increases, so the share 
also increases making the income tax rate lower and thus, labour and capital usage increases 
fostering real output supply side and thus, consumption from the demand side. These effects 
should lead to an improvement of welfare as long as 𝜏1 is bigger thanks to more consumption 
that offsets the increase on labour and the decrease of paper money. In this case the 
maximum welfare is reached when 𝜏1has the biggest impact on the reduction of income 
taxes, that is 0.071 and the income tax becomes 27.29%. This is very close to the corner 
solution because the share of electronic money is 99.74%. 
Therefore, Figure 3 shows how the variable 𝑠, rapidly increases as long as 𝜏1 is higher and 
then, it slows down when the parameter approaches 0.035. This is important to take into 
account, because it says that for an economy to prefer almost totally or partially the use of 
electronic money over cash, with s=99.74%24 (when 𝜏1 = 0.071), the income tax rate should 
be decreased from 0.3190 in the baseline calibration to 0.2792. When 𝜏1 is 0.0266 the share 
                                                          
23 The consumption equivalence equation is obtained from solving welfare in the steady-state solution for 
consumption. 
24 This value of s is consistent with the argument of Rogoff that it might happen that only an insignificant 
amount of coins or small-value bills would remain in circulation. 
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of electronic money is very low, 17.76%. This result also states the significant weight that 𝜏1 
has on the choice of holding currency. Notice that the quantity of real money barely changes. 
Moreover, note the relationship between 𝜏 and 𝑚𝑒. Whenever the income tax rate becomes 
bigger, individuals prefer to hold more cash in exchange for electronic money, so tax evasion 
and criminal activities are more likely to take place. This happens due to the fact that the 
lower the tax evasion the effect, the less the incentives that exist for giving up cash in 
exchange of electronic money.  
As expected, real output becomes bigger thanks to a lower income tax rate. The reason is 
that with a higher tax evasion effect, people obtain more resources from labour and capital 
returns, 𝑤 and 𝑟𝑘 because taxes exerted over them are lower, so more 𝑛 and 𝑘 are supplied 
in the economy, which increases output production. In fact, real output in steady-state 
solution varies 9.36% from the minimum to the maximum value of 𝜏1in the simulation.  
When it comes to welfare, a higher 𝜏1 improves welfare much more than a lower one. In 
steady state welfare is -129.0303 and it can be increased until its maximum -127.8802, where 
there is 0% permanent welfare loss with the minimum 𝜏1 in this simulation, 0.0226. This 
reaffirms the fact that more electronic money is beneficial for the economy because it fosters 
consumption and increases welfare. It can be seen in the bottom-left graph, how the 
permanent welfare loss evolves while 𝜏1 changes. Notice that it is hump-shaped because with 
the marginal decrease of 𝑠 is big enough to start creating some benefits from enhanced 
privacy that outweigh the marginal decrease of consumption in the social welfare function. 
Figure 3: 𝜏1 Effects on Real Output, Share of Electronic Money, Welfare and Cash. 
Source: Own Elaboration. MATLAB output 
After doing this simulation, it has been found that the maximum welfare loss is 1.51% of 
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real output in baseline calibration. In fact, the biggest loss is obtained when 𝜏1 takes the value 
of 0.0325 within the simulated interval in this subsection. The economy could be better off 
whenever the reduction of income tax rate due to more electronic money is higher. As long 
as 𝜏1 approaches the maximum welfare, the welfare loss reduction becomes bigger. 
6.2 Transaction cost of electronic money 
A change on the transaction cost of electronic money ℎ3 is going to be analysed. This may 
have effects on the economy if either the share of electronic money increases (positive value 
of ℎ3) or drops (negative value of ℎ3). Over this simulation, it is expected that when ℎ3 rises, 
transaction costs increase making the marginal transaction cost electronic money bigger. 
Hence, the demand for electronic money would drop because its transaction costs turn 
higher than with cash. This would lead to a decrease of 𝑠 which makes the income tax rate 
bigger and slows down the economy due to less production. Cash decreases transaction costs 
more than electronic money and this is mostly caused by a higher ℎ3.  
In this simulation, the maximum welfare possible is reached when ℎ3 makes the use of 
electronic money cheaper in transaction costs terms than paper currency. This is when it 
takes the value of -0.0275. This is a corner solution because the share of electronic money is 
99.42%.  
Therefore, Figure 4 is composed of four different plots that describe the responses when 
there is a change on the value of ℎ3. Marginal transaction cost of either 𝑚
𝑒 and 𝑚𝑐 evolves 
with changes of ℎ3. It demonstrates that the only reason for both marginal transaction costs 
to be different is the sign of ℎ3. Thus, when ℎ3 = 0 both ℎ𝑚𝑒  and ℎ𝑚𝑐 are equal and they 
take the value of -0.0435 and total transaction costs happen to be 0.0291.25 Transaction costs 
become 14.52% higher when ℎ3 is 0.0345 than when it is negative at 0.0275. 
The latter is a concern for the optimal value of electronic money share s. When electronic 
money makes transaction costs easier than paper money (h3 < 0), the drawback that 𝑚
𝑒  
had in the baseline calibration becomes an advantage since it drops transaction costs further 
than cash, and therefore, the share of electronic money becomes 99.42% when h3=-0.0275. 
Contrary, when h3=0.01 and the difference in the marginal transaction cost between cash 
                                                          
25 Note that: 
ℎ𝑚𝑐 =  ℎ1ℎ2 (
𝑐
𝑚
)
ℎ2−1
(
−𝑐
(𝑚)2
) + ℎ3
−𝑚𝑒
(𝑚)2
 = ℎ1ℎ2 (
𝑐
𝑚
)
ℎ2−1
(
−𝑐
(𝑚)2
) + ℎ3
𝑚𝑐
(𝑚)2
= ℎ𝑚𝑒   if ℎ3 takes the value of 0. 
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and electronic money starts becoming bigger, the share of electronic money shrinks rapidly 
to 2.37% when h3=0.0345. This huge increase in cash holdings caused by higher transaction 
costs for 𝑚𝑒, makes income tax rate higher due to the increase of cash in the economy and 
therefore, it leads to a lower real output, y. However, transaction costs do affect the level of 
output, so the maximum real output is not reached when the share of electronic money is at 
its maximum because at that point, h3 makes transaction costs very low reducing demand 
and thus, real output. Thus, the maximum level of real output (blue line on the bottom right 
plot), 1.7056 is when there exists an equilibrium between both effects, that is when h3=0.015 
and s=0.9272. Then it decreases by 4.46% when h3=0.0345 and by 1.00% when h3=-0.0275.  
Besides, it could be said that whenever ℎ3 is between 0 and 0.015, real output does not suffer 
major changes. However, for the economy it is better to be ℎ3 < 0.02 than ℎ3 > 0.02, 
because the increase of electronic money share in the second case, makes real output suffer 
more due to the increase it causes on the income tax rate. Therefore, the effect of electronic 
money share fosters output more than it decreases through smaller transaction costs.  
Lastly, welfare effects of the simulation show how welfare is higher when the share of 
electronic money is as much as possible. It is -129.0303 in baseline and it is reduced to 
negative 127.5262 when ℎ3 is -0.0275 and the share 99.42%, a 0% permanent welfare loss. 
Undoubtedly the permanent welfare loss follows a similar path as the bottom-left graph 
shows. Note that its hump-shape is caused due to the same reasons of tax evasion changes. 
Figure 4: ℎ3 Effect on Transaction Costs, Electronic Money Share, Real Output and Welfare 
Source: Own Elaboration. MATLAB output. 
After doing this simulation, it has been found that the permanent loss is equivalent to1.98% 
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of real output in baseline calibration. This result is close to the maximum loss, which means 
that the economy could be better off whenever the transaction costs of electronic money are 
optimized and make transaction costs cheaper and easier. As long as ℎ3 approaches the 
maximum welfare, the loss reduction becomes bigger and real output barely drops. 
6.3 Welfare cost of inflation 
This section shows how different inflation targets of monetary authorities affect the model 
and different variables. In this case the annualized rare of inflation is going to change from 
-1.47% to 8%. This is analyzed because both means of holding money have the common 
burden of the opportunity cost for holding money instead of bonds that yield the nominal 
interest rate 𝑅, which is dependent on inflation since Fisher relationship holds. In the steady-
state solution of the model, an increase of the rate of nominal money growth 𝜇, increases 
one-to-one inflation and the nominal interest rate. Subsequently, the opportunity cost of 
money holdings is higher and therefore the quantity of real money demand decreases, making 
transaction costs and the marginal transaction cost of consumption higher. The increase on 
ℎ𝑐 reduces the supply of labor and capital and therefore, output decreases by the supply side. 
The reasoning behind the setting of the simulation from inflation at -1.47% is that it is 
precisely the optimal inflation rate (𝜋∗) according to the Chicago Rule of Milton Freidman 
(1969) to maximize social welfare in the household optimizing program: “Our final rule for 
the optimum quantity of money is that it will be attained by a rate of price deflation that 
makes the nominal rate of interest equal to zero”.  Since the Fisher relationship holds in the 
model, according to the Chicago rule, the nominal interest rate, 𝑅 should be 0 and the 
optimal inflation rate becomes.26 
𝜋∗ = 𝜇∗ =
−𝜌
1 + 𝜌
=
−0.015
1 + 0.015
= −0.0147 = −1.47% 
As expected, the maximum welfare is reached when inflation or money growth are at their 
optimal level, therefore, Chicago Rule holds in this model. However, since there are negative 
opportunity costs when holding money, the quantity of real money either paper currency or 
electronic currency relative to real output 
𝑚
𝑦
, becomes extremely high, 9179.34% and recall 
that this value is 57.63% in baseline calibration. This may also represent a liquidity trap, 𝑅 =
                                                          
26 Recall that 𝑟 = 𝜌 in the steady state solution and the Fisher relationship is solved for inflation when nominal 
interest rate is 0. 
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0 when the monetary policy to boost output is ineffective regardless of the quantity of money 
issued. The latter meets somehow with the situation lived in the financial crisis. As it can be 
seen in Figure 1 and Figure 2, in both Euro area and USA the quantity of money (paper) in 
circulation increased because monetary policies were trying to boost output issuing money 
and decreasing nominal interest rates. 
𝝅 -0.0147 0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.08 
𝒎
𝒚
 
9179.34% 80.70% 68.92% 62.18% 57.63% 51.62% 46.17% 
 
As long as the quantity of money is reduced, transaction costs tend to increase, being 1.626% 
of real output at the optimal inflation rate and becoming 3.427% of real output when 
inflation is 8%. Whenever inflation is higher, transaction costs increase and real output drops. 
𝝅 -0.0147 0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.08 
𝒉
𝒚
 
1.62% 2.15% 2.37% 2.56% 2.74% 3.04% 3.42% 
 
Now, inflation changes the long-run model solution are seen. Then, Figure 5 shows that the 
only major changes on the model when inflation is moved from -1.47% to 8.00%, are on the 
real money and the transaction costs of the economy. Share of electronic money does not 
change significantly (although less inflation leads to more electronic money preference) and 
output slightly decreases with higher inflation. As it could be expected, the real money 
increases whenever steady state inflation is lower because the opportunity cost of receiving 
a yield instead of holding money becomes smaller and hence, the loss of purchasing power 
when money is held becomes lower. It shows how both means of holding money follow 
similar paths and how the real money varies significantly. Note that the simulation of -1.47% 
inflation has been omitted in the graph for real money because of the huge quantity of real 
money in steady-state would visually disrupt the graph. Figure 6 also confirms that the higher 
the inflation rate, the lower is social welfare for households.  
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Figure 5: Steady-State Inflation Changes 
Source: Own Elaboration. MATLAB output 
Table 4 shows how real output becomes lower as long as inflation rate turns bigger. The 
annual and permanent welfare loss also becomes bigger when the inflation rate deviates more 
from the optimal value of -1.47%, which is also shown in Figure 5. 
Table 4: Changes on real output and welfare loss if inflation deviates from Chicago Rule. 
𝝅 𝚫𝒚
𝒚
·100 Permanent output loss. Annual Permanent welfare loss. 
𝒄𝒆−𝒄
𝒚
·100  
-1.47% 0.000% 0.00% 
0.00% -0.152% 0.58% 
1.00% -0.216% 0.82% 
2.00% -0.269% 1.03% 
3.00% -0.322% 1.21% 
4.00% -0.363% 1.38% 
5.00% -0.404% 1.54% 
6.00% -0.444% 1.69% 
7.00% -0.480% 1.83% 
8.00% -0.515% 1.96% 
Source: Own elaboration. MATLAB output. 
After doing this simulation, it has been found that the permanent welfare loss results to be 
a 1.21% of real output when the long-run inflation rate is 3%. This loss becomes bigger as 
long as the inflation target is higher and vice versa. Likewise, a 3% rate of inflation real output 
loss amounts to 0.322% when it deviates from Chicago Rule. 
7. Conclusion 
Nowadays, new transaction technologies ease the use of electronic money. Therefore, the 
use of cash must be reconsidered since it has many disadvantages related to tax evasion, 
constrained monetary policy and criminal activities. Despite privacy issues, financial 
inclusion or the loss of seigniorage revenues, a cashless society has ever been so likely, where 
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just big denominated coins could remain in circulation for daily transactions. These issues 
are a real challenge for both authorities and regulators to be implemented. Thus, this paper 
makes a welfare analysis of a cashless economy taking into account positive and negative 
features of electronic money and paper money. 
This welfare analysis is developed by a Real Business Cycle model with money introduced as 
a transaction-facilitating tool. The model has been optimized for both firms and households 
and then turned into the long-run solution, the Steady-State. The optimizing programs result 
in 21 equations and 21 variables to be solved in MATLAB. The model has been calibrated 
to closely replicate the US economy in the long-run. The model has been useful to estimate 
changes in tax evasion, transaction costs and the annual rate of inflation. 
The results of the model simulations indicate different qualitative and quantitative 
conclusions. Inflation does negatively affect welfare and a low inflation helps to reduce the 
share of electronic money. At the Chicago Rule, real money holdings increase significantly, 
and a 3% inflation rate creates a 1.21% permanent welfare loss of output when it deviates 
from Chicago Rule. Electronic money transaction costs greatly affect the share of electronic 
money and if electronic transactions happened to be easy, welfare would rise. In case it makes 
transaction costs cheaper ℎ3 < 0, social welfare would increase from 0.74% up to 1.98% 
according to the simulation. One of the most important advantages of electronic money is 
the drop of tax evasion, which should be totally enough by its own to totally outweigh other 
related losses. Reducing the income tax rate due to less tax evasion by 7.1% instead of 3.5% 
in baseline calibration would increase permanent social welfare by 1.51% according to the 
model simulation.  
Note that no simulation has been able to lead the model to a 100% share of electronic model, 
which meets the statement of Rogoff (2016) that cash would not need to be totally phased 
out. These brand-new coins should be harder to handle, store and carry for criminal activities 
and tax evasion proposes. 
This RBC with money has been very useful to analyse the effects of electronic money on the 
economy and estimate welfare effects. Nonetheless, the model used in this paper presents 
disadvantages due to the complexity of the economy and diversity of individuals. It is well-
known that the economy is not composed by equal individuals and equal production 
structures, with welfare measured in terms of consumption, labour and privacy. 
Furthermore, the steady-state solution used in this paper does not allow to analyse how 
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electronic money would behave with shocks that causes adjustment over time. It would be 
interesting to further develop the model in the dynamic solution and incorporating other 
costs such as seigniorage and revenues such as unconstrained monetary policy.  
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